We introduce, in the first part, the notion of weakly convex pair of correspondences, we give its economic interpretation, we state a fixed point and a selection theorem. Then, by using a tehnique based on a continuous selection, we prove existence theorems of quilibrium for an abstract economy. In the second part, we define the weakly biconvex correspondences, we prove a selection theorem and we also demonstrate the existence of equilibrium for a generalized quasi-game (2003 Kim's model). In the last part of the paper, we give other applications in the game theory, finding equilibrium for abstract economies having correspondences with weakly convex graph. We show that the equilibrium exists without continuity assumptions.
Introduction
An open problem in the equilibrium theory is to prove the existence of fixed points for correspondences under nonconvexity (in the usual sense) assumptions. Some results on this subject were obtained by C. D. Horvath [7] , G. Tian [13] , X. Ding, He Yiran [3] or K. Wlodarczyk and D. Klim [15] , [16] . The aim of this paper is to prove a fixed point and a selection theorem under generalized covexity conditions and to give an application in the game theory. The importance of these results also consists of the fact that the existence of fixed points and of the equilibrium takes place without continuity properties of the involved correspondences.
Within the last years, many authors generalized the classical models of abstract economy due to A. Borglin and H. Keiding [2] , W. Shafer and H. Sonnenschein [12] or N. C. Yannelis and N. D. Prahbakar [18] . Also, W.K. Kim [8] obtained a generalization of the quasi fixed-point theorem due to I. Lefebvre [9] and, as an application, he proved an existence theorem of equilibrium for a generalized quasi-game with infinite number of agents. W.K.Kim's result concerns generalized quasi-games where the strategy sets are metrizable subsets in linear topological convex spaces.
In the first part of this paper we introduce the notion of weakly convex pair of correspondences, we give its economic interpretation, we state a fixed point and a selection theorem. Then, by using a tehnique based on a continuous selection, we prove existence theorems of quilibrium for an abstract economy. In the second part, we define the weakly biconvex correspondences, we prove a selection theorem and we also demonstrate the existence of equilibrium for a generalized quasi-game (2003 Kim's model). In the last part of the paper we give other applications in the game theory, finding equilibrium for abstract economies having correspondences with weakly convex graph. We show that the equilibrium exists without continuity assumptions.
Bi-convexity was studied by R. Aumann, S. Hart in [1] or J. Gorski, F. Pfeuffer, K. Klamroth in [5] . We continue our work on studying the existence conditions of equilibrium of quasi-games [10] or the existence of fixed points for correspondences [11] .
The paper is organized in the following way: Section 2 contains preliminaries and notation. The weakly convex pairs of correspondences are studied in Section 3. Biconvexity of the correspondences, W. K. Kim's model of quasigame and the quasi-equilibrium existence results are presented in Section 4. The equilibrium theorems for correspondences with the weakly convex graph selection property are stated in Section 5.
The correspondence T is defined by T (x) = {y ∈ Y : (x, y) ∈cl X×Y GrT } (the set cl X×Y Gr(T ) is called the adherence of the graph of T ). It is easy to see that clT (x) ⊂ T (x) for each x ∈ X. Lemma 1. [19] Let X be a topological space, Y be a non-empty subset of a topological vector space E, ß be a base of the neighborhoods of 0 in E and
Definition 1. Let X, Y be topological spaces and T : X → 2
Y be a correspondence
2. T is said to be lower semicontinuous if for each x∈ 
3 Weakly convex pairs of correspondences
We introduce the following notion. 
A fixed point theorem
We state the following fixed point theorem: 
Theorem 4. Let Y be a non-empty subset of a topological vector space E and
Proof. Let a 1 , a 2 , ..., a n be the vertices of K. Since (S, T ) is weakly convex pair of correspondences, there exist b i ∈ S(a i ), such that for every (
Since K is a (n − 1)-dimensional simplex with the vertices a 1 , ..., a n , there exists unique continuous functions λ i : K → R, i = 1, 2, ..., n such that for
We show that f is continuous. Let (x m ) m∈N be a sequence which converges to x 0 ∈ K, where
Since s : Y → K is continuous, we obtain that s•f : K → K is continuous. According to Brouwer's fixed point theorem, there exists a point
Theorem 5. (selection theorem). Let Y be a non-empty subset of a topological vector space
Y be a weakly convex pair of correspondences. Then, T has a continuous selection on K.
Economic interpretation
We consider an abstract economy with I -the set of agents. Each agent can choose a strategy from a set X i and has a preferrence correspondence
The traditional approach considers that the preferrence of agent i is characterized by a binary relation ≽ i on the set X i . A real valued function u i that satisfies
is called an utility function of the preferrence ≽ i . The relation between the utility function u i and the preferrence correspondence for each agent i is:
The aim of the equilibrium theory is to maximize each agent's utility on a convex strategy set. For that, the notion of convexity of the preferrence is very important:
The intuitive interpretation is that, given two strategies x and y, the composed strategy λx + (1 − λ)y ≽ y with λ ∈ [0, 1] is more valuable if x is already preferrable to y. For an abstract economy, if we have y i ∈ A i (x) and
For the case that, for the index i, (A i , P i ) is a weakly convex pair of correspondences, the interpretation is the following: for every
if there exists the utility function u i :
We introduce the notion of weakly convex preferrence.
Definition 4. The preferrence ≽ is called weakly convex if for each y ∈ X,
there exists x ∈ X such that for each λ ∈ [0, 1] we have that λx + (1 − λ)y ≽ y.
Applications in the equilibrium theory
First, we present the model of an abstract economy and the definition of an equilibrium.
Let I be a non-empty set (the set of agents). For each i ∈ I, let X i be a non-empty topological vector space representing the set of actions and let's define
Xi be the constraint correspondences and P i the preference correspondence.
) i∈I is said to be an abstract economy. [18] .
Definition 6. An equilibrium for Γ is defined as a point x
* ∈ X such that for each i ∈ I, x * i ∈ B i (x * ) and A i (x * , ) ∩ P i (x * ) = ∅.
Remark 1. When for each i
For the following theorems, we will use the selection theorem and a tehnique based on a continuous selection. We show the existence of equilibrium for an abstract economy without assuming the continuity of the constraint and of the preference correspondences A i and P i .
First, we prove a new equilibrium existence theorem for a noncompact abstract economy with constraint and preference correspondences A i and P i , which have the property that their intersection
is a weakly convex pair of correspondences and W i must be a simplex. To find the equilibrium point, we use Wu's fixed point theorem [17] . 
From the assumption (4) and the selection theorem 3, it follows that there exists a continuous function
Let's define the correspondence
Then, according to Tychonoff's Theorem, D is compact in the convex set X. By Wu's fixed-point theorem in [17] , applied for the correspondences S i = T i and
, which is a contradiction. Therefore, x * / ∈ W i , and hence (
For Theorem 5, we use an approximation method, in the meaning that we obtain, for each i ∈ I, a continuous selection f
an equilibrium point for the associated approximate abstract economy
for each x ∈ X and for each i ∈ I. Finally, we use Lemma 1 to get an equilibrium point for Γ in X. The compactness assumption for X i is essential in the proof. 
Theorem 7. Let Γ = (X i
,x ∈ X, A i (x) ⊂ B i (x); (3) the set W i : = {x ∈ X / (A i ∩ P i ) (x) ̸ = ∅} is
non-empty, open and
K i =clW i is a (n i − 1)-dimensional simplex in X ; (4) For each convex neighbourhood V of 0 in X i , (A i , (A i + V ) ∩ P i )
is a weakly convex pair of correspondences, where (
A i + V ) ∩ P i : K i → 2 Xi ; (5) for each x ∈ K i , x i / ∈ P i (x).
Then there exists an equilibrium point x
* ∈ X for Γ, i.e., for each i ∈ I,
Proof. For each i ∈ I, let ß i denote the family of all open convex neighborhoods of zero in
weakly convex pair of correspondences on K i , then, from the selection theorem 3, there exists a continuous function f Let's define
T V is an upper semicontinuous correspondence and also has non-empty convex closed values.
Since X is a compact convex set, according to Fan's fixed-point Theorem [4] , there exists
Since W i is open, Q V is the intersection of non-empty closed sets, then it is non-empty, closed in X.
We prove that the family {Q V : V ∈ ∏ i∈I ß i } has the finite intersection property. Let {V (1) , V (2) , ...V (n) } be any finite set of ∏ i∈I ß i and let
Proof. Since X is compact and the family {Q V : V ∈ ∏ i∈I ß i } has the finite intersection property, we have that
In the theorem above, the correspondences A i ∩ P i don't verify continuity assumptions and do not have convex or compact values. The importance of our results also consists in the fact that the existence of fixed points and of the equilibrium takes place without continuity properties of the correspondences involved.
Biconvexity of the correspondences and applications
in the game theory
Preliminaries
Let X ⊂ E 1 and Y ⊂ E 2 be two nonempty, convex sets, E 1 , E 2 are topological vector space and let B ⊂ X × Y. The y− and x− sections of B are defined as follows:
is convex for every x ∈ X and B y is convex for every y ∈ Y.
The following characterization for biconvex sets was formulated by Aumann and Hart:
is biconvex if and only if B contains all biconvex combinations of its elements.
As in the convex case, it is possible to define the biconvex hull of a given set A ⊆ X × Y .
A I is biconvex} is called the biconvex hull of A and is denoted biconv(A).
Aumann and Hart stated the following properties of the set H:
The above defined set is biconvex. Furthermore, H is the smallest biconvex set (in the sense of set inclusion), which contains A.
As biconvex combinations are, by definition, a special case of convex combinations and the convex hull conv(A) of a given set A consists of all convex combinations of the elements of A, we have:
given set. Then biconv(A) ⊆conv(A).
Aumann and Hart proposed an inductively way to construct the biconvex hull of a given set A. They defined the sequence {A n } n∈N as follows:
Let H ′ := ∪ n∈N A n denote the limit of this sequence.
Proposition 11. [1] The above constructed set H ′ is biconvex and equals H, the biconvex hull of A.
We introduce the following definition. (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ) , ..., (x n , y n )} ⊂ B, there exists z i ∈ T (x i , y i ) , (i = 1, 2, ..., n) such that for every biconvex combination
We formulate the following fixed point theorem for weakly biconvex correspondences. 
Theorem 12. Let Y be a non-empty subset of a topological vector space F and
Proof. Since T is weakly biconvex, there exist
Since K is the biconvex hull of (a 1 , b 1 ) , ..., (a n , b n ), there exists unique continuous functions λ i : K → R, i = 1, 2, ..., n such that for each (x, y) ∈ K,
We show that f is continuous. Let (x m , y m ) m∈N be a sequence which converges to 
Xi be a correspondence such that the set 
Kim's model of the generalized quasi-game and equilibrium theorems
In this section, we study the following model of a generalized quasi-game.
Let I be a nonempty set (the set of agents). For each i ∈ I, let X i be a non-empty topological vector space representing the set of actions and let's define X := ∏ If A i (x, y) = B i (x, y) for each (x, y) ∈ X × X and i ∈ I, this model coincides with the one introduced by W. K. Kim [8] .
If, in addition, for each i ∈ I, A i , P i are constant with respect to the first argument, this model coincides with the classical one of the abstract economy and the definition of equilibrium is that given in [18] . Now, we state the following equilibrium theorem for generalized quasigames with correspondences which does not have continuity properties. {(a 1 , b 1 ), (a 2 , b 2 ) , ..., (a n , b n )} ⊂ Z; 
